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Abstract
We use a limited information environment to mimic the state of confusion in an
experimental, repeated public goods game. The results show that reinforcement
learning leads to dynamics similar to those observed in standard public goods
games. However, closer inspection shows that individual decay of contributions in
standard public goods games cannot be fully explained by reinforcement learning.
According to our estimates, learning only accounts for 41 percent of the decay
in contributions in standard public goods games. The contribution dynamics of
subjects, who are identi¯ed as conditional cooperators, di®er strongly from the
learning dynamics, while a learning model estimated from the limited information
treatment tracks behavior for subjects, who cannot be classi¯ed as conditional
cooperators, reasonably well.
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11 Introduction
The degree to which subjects, who participate in an experiment, understand the task
involved is typically not observable by the researcher. E®orts to reduce confusion through
detailed instructions and to control for confusion using control questions are valuable but
can never fully rule out that some observed behavior was caused by a lack of understand-
ing. Unlike naturally selected and experienced individuals in real-world situations, people
who come to the laboratory, typically are unfamiliar and inexperienced with the choices
they need to make. Additionally, experimental environments are often arti¯cial and delib-
erately do not provide a real-world context to the experiment, which makes understanding
di±cult. Arising non-observable confusion poses a threat to the internal validity of exper-
imental results. Some behavior caused by confusion might be wrongly attributed to some
other cause. At best, confusion { if it does not lead to systematic changes of behavior {
only causes an inference problem through increased noise. Generally, confusion may thus
impair the researchers' con¯dence in internal and external validity of experimental results
(for a general discussion see Levitt and List 2007).
A widely used alternative instrument intended to overcome the problem of confusion
is repetition. Repetition enables subjects to gain familiarity with the new environment
and to experience the consequences of their decisions. However, in games, where payo®s
depend on the actions of all players in a group, a characteristic of repetition is that the
subjects do not only learn about the game itself but can also use feedback to predict
future play of others. The researcher then faces the complicated task of separating the
strategic response to this information from learning behavior that results from overcoming
confusion. This task is complicated further, as there might also be interaction e®ects, since
a strategic response is likely to depend on a player's assessment of how confused the group
members are. In this paper we tackle this problem for the domain of public goods games.
Experimental research on the private provision of public goods has an interest to
discriminate between strategic behavior and confusion. The repeated public goods exper-
iment is among the best known games in economics. It is meant to mimic behavior in
a wide class of situations outside of laboratories and classrooms. Today, social scientists
employ the experiment as tool to measure social norms and preferences (see, e.g., Camerer
and Fehr 2003). The outcome of the typical experiment is that subjects contribute more
to the public good than the standard model predicts, while contribution levels decrease
with repetition (for a recent and comprehensive list of references reporting an increase of
free riding over multiple decision rounds see Fischbacher and GÄ achter 2009). One early
explanation for this pattern of behavior is that contribution levels fall due to the learning
1of initially confused subjects (for a discussion see Ledyard 1995). Another explanation,
which is favored by many researches, is that the decay of contributions stems from the
heterogeneity of social preferences within a group, where conditional cooperators start
out with high contributions but consecutively adjust their contributions downwards as a
negative-reciprocal reaction to sel¯sh group members (see Andreoni 1995; Kurzban and
Houser 2005; Muller et al. 2008; Fischbacher and GÄ achter 2009).1
In this paper we take a new avenue to assess the role of learning of confused subjects
in explaining the dynamic pattern of choices in repeated public goods experiments. Our
approach starts with the assumption that a confused subject neither understands the
incentive structure, nor uses the contributions of other subjects as a basis for imitation
learning. One might label this kind of confusion as \ignorant". Admittedly, this view of
confusion is somewhat extreme but has a considerable advantage over other de¯nitions
when it comes to experimental methodology. Confusion of this kind can be studied in
an experiment that withholds information about the payo® structure and the choices of
other group members from subjects. A treatment, where subjects do neither know the
incentive structure nor the past choices of the group members, perfectly mimics this kind
of \ignorant" confusion. We run such a treatment and compare the contribution dynamics
to those in a standard public goods game.
The traditional approach to studying confusion in public goods games follows a di®er-
ent strategy. Confusion is identi¯ed as a residual instead of implementing conditions that
allow for studying learning directly. Designing two treatments, a standard treatment and
at least one other, where strategic and/or social motives are excluded by design, under
certain assumptions allows for an isolation of the strategic and/or social component. The
di®erence in contributions between the treatments is attributed to strategic and social
factors, respectively. Then the residual contributions are attributed to confusion. In this
tradition Andreoni (1988) compares public goods games with partner and stranger treat-
ments, in order to isolate strategic repeated game e®ects. This study and the replications
by Croson (1995) and Keser and van Winden (2000) produced outcomes that are consis-
tent with strategic motives rather than learning being the explanation for an increase in
free-riding.2
Andreoni (1995) introduced a treatment where subjects played a public goods game
but were paid according to how they rank compared to group members with respect
to their experimental earnings. In this design the dominant strategy of full free-riding
1Gintis et al. (2003) explain similar dynamics with an evolutionary approach.
2Andreoni (1988) also observed that cooperation increases again after a restart of the game, which is
at odds with the simple learning hypothesis. See also Cookson (2000).
2is preserved while the imposed zero-sum nature is designed to remove any cooperation
incentives. In this treatment, subjects' contributions fell rapidly already in early decision
rounds, which suggests that the decline of cooperation in the standard game \may not be
due to learning, but instead ... due to frustrated attempts at kindness" (p. 892).
Houser and Kurzban (2002) designed a study to tighten the bounds on the impact of
confusion as identi¯ed by Andreoni (1995). They ran a \computer condition" in which all
other group members were simulated by automata. O®-equilibrium play in the computer
condition cannot be associated with social motives towards other players. Hence, a com-
parison to a standard public goods game was used to isolate the e®ect of confusion. The
results were that approximately 50% of all contributions can { under certain assumptions
{ be attributed to confusion and that the contributions in the computer condition fell
with repetition at a rate much higher than in the human condition.3 The second obser-
vation casts doubts on the previously identi¯ed role of reciprocity in causing the decay of
contributions.
We contribute to this literature in that we analyze the contribution behavior under a
condition of limited information. The study of behavior in limited information environ-
ments is common in experiments on learning. Mookherjee and Sopher (1994) varied the
information available to the subjects about past choices and payo®s of their opponents
in a repeated matching pennies game. They found that experience with choices in the
past a®ected behavior under limited information. Van Huyck et al. (1996) asked whether
a simple reinforcement learning algorithm can predict behavior in a coordination game.
To do so, they limited the information available to subjects to their feasible choices and
their experienced payo®s. The results were that the median play converges to the inte-
rior equilibrium and that convergence is much faster than reinforcement learning would
predict. Chen and Khoroshilov (2003) evaluate alternative payo®-based learning models
to explain behavior in a cost-sharing and coordination game under limited information.
They found that a simple reinforcement learning model tracks the data not as well as
the payo®-assessment learning model (Sarin and Vahid 1999) or the experience-weighted
attraction learning model (Camerer and Ho 1999).
We believe that the method of limiting information can generate novel insights that
add to the hitherto incomplete picture of learning in the repeated public goods experi-
ment. In particular, the extreme assumption of ignorant confusion assures that subjects
can only learn by reinforcement. More sophisticated learning models such as belief learn-
ing, experience-weighted attraction learning or rule learning are ruled out (for a nice
3Ferraro and Vossler (2006) used a similar design for the same purpose and complemented it with
econometric modeling.
3overview of alternative learning models see Camerer 2003, chapter 6, and the references
therein). In fact, all studies that try to isolate the dynamic e®ects of confusion have to
make assumptions about the nature of confusion. For example, in the study by Houser
and Kurzban (2002) contributions fell faster in the computer than in the human con-
dition. This observation might indicate that cooperation is stable at an initial level in
the absence of confusion. The authors note that such a conclusion would be warranted
only if \cooperation due to confusion is similar in the human and computer conditions"
(p. 1066). Such an assumption may not hold empirically (see Duersch et al. 2009, who
explore how subjects learn to play a Cournot duopoly game against computers that are
programmed to follow one of various learning algorithms).
The merit of studying confusion as ignorance is that it gives su±cient structure to
model behavior by simple learning dynamics and at the same time avoids a great deal
of other necessary implicit assumptions. While measured confusion in traditional experi-
ments is a residual and might contain other impact factors not removed by the design, a
limited information approach provides additional control. On the °ip side, the assump-
tion of ignorant confusion comes at a price. Subjects that are more sophisticated but
still confused are not properly represented. Confused subjects, who are cleverer than the
assumed \ignorant" subjects, are expected to learn and reduce their contributions more
quickly (if they are self interested).4 Hence, the dynamics observed in a treatment in-
ducing confusion de¯ned as ignorance can be seen as a lower bound to the true impacts
of confusion on contribution dynamics. We believe that complementing the traditional
approach, which can be seen as providing an upper bound (in particular Houser and
Kurzbahn, 2002), with a methodology that provides a lower bound is valuable in that it
helps to better understand the impact of confusion on free-riding.
Our results are as follows. At the aggregate level we ¯nd that contributions drop o®
in both our confusion condition and the standard public goods game. This observation
supports the claim that reinforcement learning leads to dynamics similar to those readily
interpreted as conditional cooperation in standard public goods games. However, we also
¯nd that the contributions in the standard treatment decrease at a signi¯cantly higher
rate than in the confusion condition. According to our estimates learning only accounts
4Janssen and Ahn (2006) apply an agent-based modeling approach to estimate the dynamic pattern of
contributions in the repeated public goods experiment. They conclude that the stylized facts about the
contribution dynamics are explicable only by a complicated mixture of social preferences, learning, and
signaling. Within the learning explanation, they found reinforcement learning to play a prominent role.
However, their results depend very much on the speci¯c functional forms they used. Their study also
di®ers from ours in that it does not employ limited information to reduce the complexity of the choice
environment.
4for 41 percent of the contribution dynamics. We also analyzed whether the reduction of
confusion (due to reinforcement learning) can cause correlated behavior at the individual
level that can be mistaken for conditional cooperation. A dynamic panel analysis provides
direct evidence that the correlation of contributions with average past contributions of
the other group members cannot be explained by the reduction of confusion. Moreover,
we used our estimation results to simulate contributions of those classi¯ed as \conditional
cooperators" and of \others". While the learning dynamics estimated from our limited
information treatment does a poor job at explaining the behavior of \conditional coop-
erators", it tracks that of the \others" reasonably well. Finally, we use our estimation
results to investigate if a hypothetical group of four conditional cooperators would be able
to prevent contributions from declining. We ¯nd that they would not be able to achieve
stable cooperation.
The next section describes the experimental design. Section 3 presents our ¯ndings
and section 4 concludes.
2 Experimental design
Our design deliberately withholds information about the game from the subjects. Par-
ticipants in the Learning Condition only know the admissible action space and that the
environment may change over time. After each stage subjects are informed about their
payo® (see Appendix A).
We employ a within-subject comparison across two phases, which we complement
by a control treatment that ensures that we can test for the e®ect of the same subject
participating in two treatments. The within-subject comparison enables us to observe
the same subject's behavior both in a state of confusion (Learning Condition) and in an
otherwise identical public goods game, where subjects have all the information (Standard
Condition). Each condition consists of 20 periods. In the Learning Condition, the subjects
choose a number between 0 and 20 in each period. The subjects do not know that this
number is a contribution choice. The instructions tell them that the aim of the experiment
is the study of learning behavior. We inform the subjects that their payo® is determined
by their choice and \other factors that might change across periods".
At the end of this ¯rst phase, the subjects in the within-subject treatment are informed
that a new experiment (the Standard Condition) will start. Only at this stage, they are
given instructions for a standard linear public goods game, where they are assigned to
5groups of four.5 In the control treatment subjects only play the standard public goods
game with instructions. This design enables us to test if the fact that the subjects played
phase one ¯rst altered the behavior in the following standard public goods game. We did
not ¯nd any di®erences in behavior and therefore are con¯dent that our within-subject
analysis is valid.
The structure of the experimental public goods game was as follows. Every period
the subjects receive 20 points as their initial endowment. Every point invested into a
public good pays 0.4 Australian Cents to each subject in the group, while every point
kept for private investment pays 1 Cent to only the subject who kept it. This underlying
structure was the same in both Learning and Standard Condition. The sole di®erence
was the information the subjects received. In the standard condition full free-riding is
a dominant strategy and therefore in the subgame-perfect Nash Equilibrium noone ever
contributes anything. It would be socially optimal however, if everyone contributed their
full endowment.
3 Results
We ran ¯ve sessions with 16 or 20 subjects each. Out of 96 subjects in total, 60 were
participating in the within-subject treatment (Learning Condition in phase 1 followed by
the Standard Condition in phase 2) and 36 in control treatment (the Standard Condition
in phase 1, no phase 2). The subjects were ¯rst-year students at the University of Adelaide
from a variety of ¯elds, who had never before been in an experiment. The experiments
were conducted with the software package z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). The experiment
lasted between 15 (control treatment) and 25 minutes (both phases), and the average
subject earned the equivalent of US$ 10.1 (in Australian Dollars) within this time.
Figure 1 shows the time series of the average contributions in the learning condition as
a percentage of the endowment. The black line shows the average observed contribution
behavior. As one would expect for a situation where subjects cannot understand the
implications of their behavior, the contributions start out around the midpoint of the
admissible action space. With repeated play, however, contributions drop o® from 53.4
percent of the total endowment in period one to 35.7 percent in period 20. On average
(using a linear trend) contributions drop by 0:18 units per period. This negative time
trend is signi¯cant at the 1-percent level.6
5We told the subjects in the within-subject condition that they will now participate in a new experi-
ment, and also used very di®erent styles for the instructions and screen layouts.
6We use robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on groups throughout this paper.
63.1 A learning model
The observation that chosen numbers decrease with repetition in the Learning Condition
just as contributions do in the standard public goods game provides support for the claim
that learning can be mistaken for conditional cooperation. To gain some more con¯dence
that our Learning Condition accurately picks up learning dynamics { and nothing else {
we compare the actual behavior to the simulated outcomes of a simple learning model.
A stochastic adaptive decision rule maps the observed history { in our case past
contributions and past pro¯ts { into a probability distribution from which the actual
contribution is drawn. In the past a large variety of di®erent learning models requiring
di®erent levels of sophistication of subjects have been proposed.7 The rule we use is
in the tradition of reinforcement learning. This is governed by the sparse information
environment in our Learning Condition. \Confusion as ignorance" as observed in this
treatment, means that individuals do not know the underlying structure of the public
goods game. They also do not observe any action of the other group members. Therefore,
more sophisticated learning models such as belief learning, experience-weighted attraction
learning or rule learning are ruled out. We also restrict the memory of the learning rule.
Individuals decide over their choices by comparing the payo®s resulting from their last
two choices.8
So we arrive at an extremely simple learning model. De¯ne the set of players as
I = f1;2;3;4g and the action space as C = f0;1;:::;20g. Denote the contribution of
person i 2 I in period t 2 f1;2;::;20g as ci
t 2 C: The player uses the payo®s p and the
own choices of the last two periods to determine the contribution in the current period (if
possible). The attraction of choosing a certain contribution A(ci
t) is therefore a function












After having observed the two last outcomes given the choices made, for the next round
individuals only consider choices which are closer to the choice that resulted in a higher
payo®. Suppose ci
t¡1 was greater than ci
t¡2 and the payo® in period t¡1 was greater than
in period t¡2, then the individual only chooses values in the interval from the midpoint
between the two previous choices to the maximum choice (20). For equal pro¯ts in periods
t¡1 and t¡2 the support is [0;20], as then the history contains no information about in
7See Camerer (2003, chapter 6) and the references therein for a nice overview.
8We use such a short memory for two reasons: i) in the instructions we inform subjects that the
environment might change over time and ii) Sarin and Vahid (2004) have shown that the use of rapidly
decaying past attractions improves the ¯t of reinforcement-learning models.
7which direction to go. Moreover, the support will also be the whole spectrum of possible
choices if the previous two choices were identical.
To ¯nd the region of choices (the support) that satis¯es these conditions given the















Then we can introduce a variable di
t that tells us whether the player wants to choose a
number closer to the higher (di









Note that if either the pro¯ts or the previous choices have not changed between periods
t ¡ 2 and t ¡ 1 then we have di
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Next, we have to specify which point within the admissible range will be chosen. The
simplest assumption is that subjects are equally likely to choose any element of Ci
t.9 To
implement this we set the attraction for a choice in Ci
t equal to one, while the attraction
of a contribution outside of Ci












To arrive at the desired uniform distribution over the support Ci
t we transform attrac-












Analyzing the data, we found that the median of choices for both experimental con-
ditions is approximately in the middle of the support, which is consistent with assuming
9This assumption di®ers slightly from a traditional reinforcement learning model in that it allows for
\strategy similarity". Sarin and Vahid (2004) show that this modi¯cation helps to explain behavior in
minimal information games like ours.
8choices with equal probabilities. However, we observed quite a few focal points (bottom
or top of the range), which cannot be modeled with the uniform distribution. This is
not problematic, since this clustering around boundary values typically occurred in the
Standard Condition, where we do not expect the learning model to ¯t well.
The remaining question is how to deal with the choice behavior of the individuals in
periods one and two. In these early periods there is not enough information available
to use reinforcement-learning. We follow the widespread approach and use the observed
choice distribution in those ¯rst two periods. The ¯rst two choices are assumed to be
driven by some factors exogenous to our learning model, such as focal points.
In summary, the choice rule in our learning model is simple. A subject only chooses
numbers that are closer to the number that led to the higher payo® in the previous two
periods. For simplicity we assume that subjects randomize over all choices that are in the
remaining domain with equal probability. In cases where a subject is not able to learn
anything from her last choices { either the last two choices or the last two payo®s are
equal { a subject randomizes over the unrestricted domain.
This simple model produces quite tricky dynamics. The grey line in Figure 1 shows
the result of simulated behavior from the model. We simulated 5000 groups. As the
starting values are not determined endogenously in the model, we drew them from the
empirical distributions of the real contributions observed in the two ¯rst periods.10 We
see that a model as simple as ours does very well at tracking the behavior in the Learning
Condition. Hence, we feel con¯dent to conclude that our Learning Condition can be used
to isolate learning dynamics from the dynamics generated by strategic behavior of any
kind.
Our next step is to quantify how much of the downward trend of contributions in
the standard public goods game (Standard Condition and control treatment) is due to
the reduction of confusion. In Figure 2, the black line plots the average contributions
of the subjects in the Standard Condition. Obviously, the rate at which subjects reduce
their contributions is greater than in the Learning Condition. In the Standard Condition,
contributions drop from 57.7 percent of the total endowment in period one to 16.6 percent
in period 20.
As before, the grey line in Figure 2 shows the choices simulated using the learning
model with the starting values drawn from the empirical distributions of the ¯rst two pe-
riods. The learning model does not ¯t the data well. The dynamics in the standard public
10We also simulated the learning model with di®erent initial choices. Even starting with extreme
values (only 0 or 20) simulated behavior quickly converges to that following starting values drawn from
the empirical distribution.
9Figure 1: Time series of average contributions in the Learning Condition
goods game appear to be di®erent than the simulated reinforcement-learning dynamics,
which performed so well at explaining behavior in the Learning Condition. A Wilcoxon
matched-pairs test (for the subjects that played both phases) con¯rms that the deviations
of the average group contributions from the simulated contribution averages summed over
the 20 periods are signi¯cantly smaller in the Learning Condition (p < 0:01;N = 15).11
The analysis above shows that a reinforcement-learning model explains the dynamics in
the Learning Condition, while it fails to explain the dynamics in the standard public goods
game. The learning speed predicted by the model is insu±cient to explain actual behavior
in the Standard Condition. Therefore confusion de¯ned as ignorance cannot explain all of
the decrease in cooperation in the public goods game. Even after controlling for learning
dynamics some decay in contributions still remains.12 In the Standard Condition the
linear time trend is ¡0:44, which is signi¯cantly di®erent both from zero and ¡0:18 (the
time trend estimated for the Learning Condition).
To summarize: Assuming that confusion in a standard public goods game takes the
form of ignorance, we conclude that the reduction of confusion accounts for ¡0:18= ¡
0:44 = 41 percent of the total decrease in cooperation. From our discussion above, this
¯gure gives a lower bound for the true impact of learning on contribution dynamics, as
11The average mean square error of the simulation is more than four times larger in the Standard
condition (3.66 vs. 0.82 points).
12Taking the di®erence between the real and simulated contributions in Figure 2 reveals that the
remaining dynamics still point downwards.
10confusion as ignorance is an extreme assumption.
Figure 2: Time series of average contributions in the standard condition
3.2 Econometric Analysis
In what follows, we investigate the dynamics in the two treatments econometrically. We
run two separate dynamic panel regressions { one per treatment { where we try to explain
ci
t, the contribution in period t, with lagged own contributions (ci
t¡1;ci
t¡2) and the past




t¡2). We also include period
dummies. This econometric model is designed to test for reciprocity in the Standard
Condition and to check if the Learning Condition can produce data that could be misin-
terpreted as being generated by reciprocity. We are mainly interested in the coe±cient on
the lagged average contribution of the other group members. A positive signi¯cant coef-
¯cient in the Standard Condition is evidence for reciprocity, as it measures how subjects
react to past kindness (or unkindness) of the other group members. However, a positive
coe±cient in the Learning Condition would mean that the simple learning environment
can produce the same dynamics. This would support the hypothesis that the positive
coe±cient in the Standard Condition might not be due to reciprocity but learning.
Note that simple random-e®ect panel-data estimators yield biased estimates if lagged
dependent variables are included, since by construction, the unobserved panel-level e®ects
are correlated with the lagged dependent variables. For this reason, we use an Arellano-
Bond GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond 1991) with additional moment conditions
11(Arellano and Bover 1995, Blundell and Bond 1998), which improve the performance of
the estimator.13
3.2.1 The standard condition
Table 1 reports the estimation results for the Standard Condition. The standard errors
for the coe±cients are reported in parentheses. Two stars indicate signi¯cance on the
one-percent level, one star on the ¯ve percent level. We ¯nd that the evolution of the
contributions of an individual is governed by two main in°uences. On the one hand,
there is a feedback structure. Contributions react to the past own and past average
contributions of others. On the other hand there are some period e®ects, which are
independent from the feedback structure.
The regression shows that the contribution in the previous period has a positive in-
°uence on the actual contribution. Contributions are somewhat persistent. More impor-
tantly, actual contributions ci
t increase with the average contribution of the other group
members from the previous period c
¡i
t¡1. Previously generous group members who con-
tribute, induce the subjects to reciprocate with a higher contribution. An increase in
the average last period contribution of the other group members by one unit induces an
increase of a subject's contribution by about one third of a unit. Through the persistence
of the own contribution this increase will have a positive but decaying in°uence on future
contributions. In the public goods game this kind of reciprocity is responsible for a large
part of the decay. As some subjects reduce their contributions, other subjects will respond
with negative reciprocity and will reduce theirs in the future.
If we ignore the insigni¯cant second lags and all time e®ects (but include the intercept)
then contributions within a group have a single stable steady state where all subjects con-
tribute somewhat less than 12 monetary units or 60 percent.14 If subjects kept behaving
like this from the beginning of the game (here period 3) they would soon reach this steady
state. However, the period e®ects push the steady state downwards. If we take the aver-
age of all time dummies in the model then the steady state the contributions converge to
is at about 4:8 monetary units (24 percent). For periods with large negative time e®ects
(such as periods 14, 18 and 20) the steady state shifts to full free riding. The downward
13We use the two-step estimation technique with robust standard errors. All our models passes tests for
the validity of the over-identi¯cation restrictions (Sargan Test) and autocorrelation in the ¯rst-di®erenced
errors (Arrelano-Bond Test).




t¡1, replace the lagged own and average other contributions by
the own actual contributions, plug in the estimated coe±cients and solve.
12Table 1: Dynamic Panel Estimation of contributions in the standard condition













Period dummies, t = 3 omitted
t = 4 -0.807¤ (0.382)
t = 5 -1.334¤¤ (0.307)
t = 6 -1.646¤¤ (0.361)
t = 7 -2.167¤¤ (0.602)
t = 8 -1.731¤ (0.755)
t = 9 -1.772 (0.944)
t = 10 -1.535 (0.796)
t = 11 -2.157¤ (0.926)
t = 12 -1.809 (0.994)
t = 13 -2.318¤ (0.968)
t = 14 -3.175¤¤ (1.048)
t = 15 -2.301¤ (1.175)
t = 16 -3.061¤ (1.419)
t = 17 -2.599 (1.553)
t = 18 -3.134 (1.610)
t = 19 -3.243¤ (1.638)





shift caused by the period e®ects tends to be larger in the later periods of the game. We
also ¯nd a strong end e®ect in the ¯nal period.
Note that the reciprocity resulting from the estimation is quite weak compared to
13strong reciprocity or tit-for-tat behavior.15 A large part of the contribution is not de-
termined by the lagged contributions of the other group members. There is quite some
persistence. Ceteris paribus, subjects who start with higher contributions keep contribut-
ing more. In addition we observe otherwise not explained time dependent level e®ects.
These level e®ects tend to reduce contributions as the game progresses. Consequently,
reciprocity explains some but not all decay of contributions. Compared to period three
(the ¯rst period for which we can estimate period e®ects), ceteris paribus a subject con-
tributes about 4.8 (out of a maximum of 20) monetary units less in the last period.
However, it is important to keep in mind that this is average behavior and does not take
into account that there might be di®erent types of subjects.
Figure 3 shows the contribution dynamics under the assumptions that the players
2;3;4 initially choose identical contributions. This reduces the dimensionality of the
dynamics to two and allows plotting. In the graph we include an average of the period
e®ects (, which is ¡2:17). The blue (bold) dot represents the unique steady state the
contributions converge to. Note that this steady state and the fact that it is globally and
asymptotically stable are independent of our assumptions that three players start with
the same initial contribution.16
3.2.2 The Learning Condition
We have seen that the dynamic panel estimation for the Standard Condition is consistent
with negative reciprocity being responsible for (at least some of) the decay of contribu-
tions. We now ask if this could be an artifact of learning dynamics. In other words, does
the Learning Condition produce similar dynamics as the Standard Condition? As we have
seen in previous sections, both treatments show decay of contributions over time. The
decay is stronger in the the standard condition though. This alone does not prove that
the processes driving the decay are di®erent. For this reason we run the same regression
we used for the Standard Condition also for the learning data. Table 2 shows the results.
The regression results clearly show that the dynamics in the Learning Condition are
quite di®erent to those in the Standard Condition. There is no signi¯cant feedback.
There is no signi¯cant in°uence of past own or past average contributions of other group
members.17 The regression does a bad job explaining the data in the Learning Condition.
15Strong reciprocity would imply a coe±cient of one, while tit-for-tat behaviour would also require that
all other coe±cients are equal to zero.
16The coe±cient matrix of the dynamic system has eigenvalues which are below unity.
17This is established by testing if the coe±cients on the four variables capturing past contributions
(own or by others) are jointly di®erent from zero, which they are not (p > 0:87).
14Figure 3: Contribution dynamics in the standard condition (with average period e®ects)
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The dynamics are driven by factors not included in the model, as only the intercept and
some period e®ects are signi¯cant.
Summarizing our results so far, we can say that the dynamics from the two di®erent
treatments are clearly distinct. A simple learning model explains the data in the Learning
Condition reasonably well, while it fails to explain the data from the Standard Condition.
Providing further evidence for this claim, a dynamic panel-data regression designed to
identify the occurrence of reciprocity ¯ts well in the case of the standard public goods
game. The parameter on the in°uence of the past average contribution of other group
members on the own contribution hints at reciprocity, as it is positive. The same re-
gression model does not ¯t well for the learning data and the coe±cient of interest is
not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. These ¯ndings provide strong evidence against the
claim that learning of subjects initial in the state of ignorant confusion can explain the
typical dynamics in public goods games. In other words, dynamics typically interpreted
as stemming (at least partly) from the breakdown of cooperation due to conditional coop-
erators withdrawing their concern for free-riders is not an artefact of simple reinforcement
15Table 2: Dynamic Panel Estimation of contributions in the Learning Condition













Period dummies, t = 3 omitted
t = 4 -1.156 (0.844)
t = 5 -4.200¤¤ (1.130)
t = 6 -2.718 (1.622)
t = 7 -2.161 (1.348)
t = 8 -1.946 (1.270)
t = 9 -3.026¤ (1.209)
t = 10 -2.783¤ (1.378)
t = 11 -3.067¤ (1.226)
t = 12 -3.152¤¤ (1.176)
t = 13 -5.145¤¤ (1.381)
t = 14 -3.690¤ (1.734)
t = 15 -4.082¤ (1.757)
t = 16 -4.048¤ (1.686)
t = 17 -3.737¤ (1.691)
t = 18 -3.188 (1.939)
t = 19 -4.816¤¤ (1.752)





learning by confused subjects.
163.3 Individual analysis and di®erent types of subjects
The analysis so far has been on an aggregate (or average) level. In this section we
want to dig a bit deeper and look at individual behavior. A last test of whether one
could wrongly attribute the contribution dynamics to conditional cooperation explicitly
takes into account individual heterogeneity with respect to social preferences and learning
by exploiting the within-subject variation between phase one (Learning Condition) and
phase two (Standard Condition). Appendix B contains a table indicating whether a
subject's contributions are signi¯cantly correlated with past contributions of others within
a treatment (Spearman rank-correlation coe±cient, 5-percent level).
In the Learning Condition there are only four out of 60 subjects (6.6 percent) who
exhibit a signi¯cantly positive correlation, whereas in the Standard Condition 32 of 60
(53.3 percent) do so. The subjects identi¯ed as conditional cooperators due to positive
correlation in the standard condition are therefore unlikely to be just confused subjects
who learn. Only 12.5 percent of the subjects (four out of 32) showing positive correlation
in the standard condition also show a positive correlation in the Learning Condition. An
individual, who behaves in a way consistent with conditional cooperation in the standard
condition, typically does not show that same behavior in the Learning Condition. This is
more evidence that learning behavior (in the sense of reduced ignorance) does not fully
explain the decay in public goods games, which leaves room for conditional cooperation
as an important factor.
The fact that in the standard condition not all but only about 53.3 percent of subjects
exhibit a positive correlation of their contributions with the past contributions made by
their group members shows that there is quite some heterogeneity. While these subjects
conform with the criterion for conditional cooperation, the others do not. In the previous
section we estimated average contribution dynamics. It is instructive to also separately
estimate the contribution dynamics of the two sub-populations.
Table 3 shows the regression results for the sub-populations of the \conditional coop-
erators" and the \others" in the standard public goods game. The dynamics of the con-
ditional cooperators are as expected. These subjects react strongly to the average lagged
contribution of the other group members. By design, picking out only the subjects, who
exhibit positive correlation between ci
t and c
¡i
t¡1, increases the estimated coe±cient (here
from 0:346 to 0:496). Conditional cooperation is still not \perfect" though. Three group
members, who increase their contribution by one monetary unit on average only induce
a conditional cooperator (the fourth group member) to increase her contribution by half
a unit. Interestingly, the conditional cooperators do not exhibit signi¯cant persistence.
17Table 3: Estimation of contributions in the standard condition by subject type
Cond. Coop. Others
Variable Coef. (S. E.) Coef. (S. E.)
Lagged own contribution
ci
t¡1 0:185 (0:198) 0:181 (0:096)
ci
t¡2 ¡0:127 (0:202) ¡0:021 (0:086)
Lagged average contribution of others
c
¡i
t¡1 0:496¤¤ (0:129) 0:074 (0:128)
c
¡i
t¡2 ¡0:052 (0:226) ¡0:068 (0:106)
Period dummies, t=3 omitted
t = 4 1:290 (1:291) ¡1:819¤ (0:776)
t = 5 1:292 (1:330) ¡1:979¤¤ (0:688)
t = 6 ¡0:339 (1:122) ¡2:592¤¤ (0:859)
t = 7 ¡1:413 (1:567) ¡3:062¤¤ (0:684)
t = 8 ¡1:041 (1:950) ¡2:783¤ (1:092)
t = 9 ¡1:116 (2:470) ¡4:478¤¤ (1:343)
t = 10 ¡2:745 (2:863) ¡3:372¤ (1:417)
t = 11 ¡1:846 (3:336) ¡3:795¤ (1:615)
t = 12 ¡2:824 (3:399) ¡3:038¤ (1:530)
t = 13 ¡2:979 (3:287) ¡4:416¤¤ (1:451)
t = 14 ¡3:583 (3:788) ¡4:342¤¤ (1:600)
t = 15 ¡3:139 (4:244) ¡3:933¤¤ (1:404)
t = 16 ¡5:221 (4:322) ¡3:844¤ (1:874)
t = 17 ¡3:396 (4:814) ¡4:982¤ (2:008)
t = 18 ¡4:726 (4:821) ¡4:857¤ (2:004)
t = 19 ¡5:134 (4:669) ¡4:703¤ (2:140)
t = 20 ¡6:211 (5:278) ¡5:403¤ (2:121)




Furthermore, a group which consists entirely of \conditional cooperators" is not able
to sustain full cooperation. To see this we used the estimated dynamics (including the
period e®ects) and simulated contributions for a group of four identical \conditional co-
18operators". As starting values we used the empirical average ¯rst-period contributions of
the conditional cooperators, which were around 61:5 percent. The time series identi¯ed
by circles in Figure 4 depicts the resulting contributions. In early periods groups are able
to build considerable cooperation. In periods ¯ve to eleven cooperation moves close to
100 percent. Then negative exogenous period e®ects start to destroy the achieved level
of cooperation. Contributions fall by about seven to eight percentage points per period.
The observation that even subjects who are deemed to be \conditional cooperators" are
not able to sustain full cooperation is consistent with the recent study by Fischbacher and
Gaechter (2009). The existence of free-riders is not necessary for contributions to decline
eventually.
Figure 4 also shows the simulated contributions of \conditional cooperators" depend-
ing on how many conditional cooperators are contained in a group. The simulation is
again based on the dynamics previously estimated. For the subjects classi¯ed as \oth-
ers" the starting contribution is taken from the empirical distribution (around 52 percent
of the endowment). It is apparent that the ¯rst non-cooperator in a group has a very
strong in°uence. A single non-cooperator prevents a group from reaching full cooperation
temporarily. Facing one non-cooperator, cooperators reduce their contributions already
after period ¯ve. The existence of a free-rider accelerates the decline of contributions
from \conditional cooperators". Adding additional non-cooperators does not change the
dynamics much but slightly shifts the cooperators' contributions downwards.
Figure 4: Contribution dynamics in mixed groups (conditional cooperators and group
averages)


























Finally, we investigate if the subjects we called \others" exhibit contribution dynamics
that could stem from the reduction of ignorant confusion. Recall that subjects that were
19not identi¯ed as conditional cooperators do not react to the past contributions of the other
group members. The same is true for the subjects in the Learning Condition (see Table 2).
Under some (very) strong assumptions we could hypothesize that the contributions of the
two groups should follow the same dynamics. If (a) the dynamics in our learning treatment
capture all learning dynamics (even though the information environment is quite di®erent
to the standard treatment), (b) the subjects in the category \others" have no other
motivation than to maximize their payo® and if (c) the \others" do not expect to be able to
strategically manipulate the contributions of potentially existing conditional cooperators
then the dynamics should be the same. We do not really expect all these assumptions
to hold. However, not too dissimilar dynamics would give us some con¯dence that our
Learning Condition actually captures something comparable to learning dynamics in the
standard public goods game.
Figure 5 plots the two contribution time series (the estimated dynamics for \oth-
ers" and the actual average contributions in the Learning Condition). Contributions of
\others" in the Standard Condition fall below the average contributions in the Learning
Condition, after starting o® almost identically. Both curves are relatively °at if one com-
pares them to the contributions of the \conditional cooperators" from Figure 4. So on
average the time series show similarities. However, recall that on an individual level we
have found some di®erences: in the Learning Condition contributions show no signi¯cant
persistence (the coe±cient on the own lagged contribution is positive but not signi¯cant),
while the \others" in the standard condition exhibit slight persistence (only signi¯cant
at the 10 percent level though) in their contributions. We conclude that our Learning
Condition (as expected) cannot capture all the learning and other potentially relevant be-
havioral factors beyond conditional cooperation at work in standard public goods games.
Nevertheless, the similarities of the time series (as described above) give us some con¯-
dence that the dynamics in the Learning Condition are related to the unobserved learning
dynamics in standard public goods games.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we report on a novel experiment designed to identify the in°uence of con-
fusion on the dynamics in repeated public goods games. In contrast to previous studies,
we study confusion in a benchmark treatment by withholding information on the struc-
ture of the game (instead of treating confusion as a residual) and compare the resulting
contributions to those in a standard public goods game. We argue that this approach
can provide a lower bound for the role confusion plays in reducing contributions over
20Figure 5: Contribution dynamics of \others" in the standard condition vs. all subjects in
the Learning Condition







All Hlearning, actual dataL
Others Hstandard, simulatedL
time. We ¯nd that the reduction of confusion causes a decay in contributions over time.
However, learning only accounts for 41 percent of the total decay. Furthermore, we could
not ¯nd evidence for the reduction of confusion (due to reinforcement learning) producing
correlation patterns of contributions within groups that could be wrongly attributed to
conditional-cooperation behavior. Consequently, we conclude that part of the dynamics
in public goods games is due to conditional cooperators reacting to low contributions of
other group members. This claim is backed by both within-subject comparisons of behav-
ior across treatments and dynamic panel analysis allowing for heterogeneity with respect
to types of subjects. In line with ¯ndings from other studies, conditional cooperation is
not su±cient to prevent the decline of contributions even in groups where all subjects
can be classi¯ed as conditional cooperators. Finally, we observe similar contribution time
series for subjects who could not be classi¯ed as conditional cooperators in the Standard
Condition and for subjects in the Learning Condition. This provides some support for our
underlying assumption that the sort of confusion we have considered in our experiment
generates learning dynamics that are also relevant in standard public goods games.
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24A Instructions
A.1 Instructions to subjects for the Learning Condition
General Information
You are participating in an experiment on learning behaviour
Money
In the experiment you earn points, which will be converted into real money
at the end of the experiment with the following exchange rate:
100 points = AUD 1:25.
Your earnings are paid in cash at the end of the experiment
Please note
It is strictly forbidden to communicate with other participants during the
experiment. You are not allowed to speak with other participants.
If you have questions during the experiment please raise your arm and some-
body will come and help you.
The timing of the experiment
The proceedings for the 20 periods are:
At the beginning of each period you see the following screen:
In every period you just have to make a single decision. You simply have to
choose a number between 0 and 20. After you have entered your number and
have clicked \OK" you will see the following result screen:
25Here you can see your previous decision and the number of points you receive.
How is the outcome determined?
Your income depends on the number you have entered. However, other factors
may in°uence your income. These factors may change from period to period.
This means that a certain number you choose does not lead to the same
outcome all the time.
Are there any further questions?
26A.2 Instructions to subjects for the standard condition and for
the control treatment.
Experimental Instructions
Thank you for participating in the experiment. If you read these instructions
carefully and follow all rules, you can earn money. The money will be paid
out to you in cash immediately after the experiment. During the experiment
we shall not speak of Dollars but rather of points. Points are converted to
Dollars at the following exchange rate:
100 Points = AUD 1.25
It is forbidden to speak to other participants during the experiment. If you
have any question, please ask us. We will gladly answer your questions indi-
vidually. It is very important that you follow this rule. Otherwise, we shall
have to exclude you from the experiment and from all payments.
Participants of this experiments are randomly assigned into groups of 4 mem-
bers, i.e., there are three more persons forming a group together with you.
The composition of groups will remain the same during the whole experiment,
i.e. there will always be the same persons in your group. The identity of your
group members will not be revealed to you at any time. At the start of each
period, each participant gets 20 points. We will refer to these points as your
endowment. Your task is it to decide, how many of your 20 points you want
to contribute to a project or to keep for yourself.
Your income consists of two parts:
1. Points that you keep
2. Your \income from the project". This income is calculated as follows:
Your income from the project = 0:4£ Sum of contributions of all group mem-
bers to the project
The income of the other members of your group is determined in the same way,
i.e. each group member receives the same income from the project. Suppose,
for example, that the total contributions to the project by all members in your
group sum up to 60. In this case you and every other member of your group
receives 0:4 £ 60 = 24 points as income from the project. Suppose that you
27and the other 3 members of your group in total contribute only 10 points to
the project. In this case every group member receives 0:4 £ 10 = 4 points as
income from the project.
For each point that you keep for yourself you earn an income of one point. If
you contribute that point to the project, instead, the sum of contributions to
the project would rise by one point, and your income from the project would
rise by 0:4£1 = 0:4 points. However, the income of the other group members
would also rise by 0:4 points, such that the total income of the group would
rise by 4£0:4 = 1:6 points. Your contribution to the project, therefore, raises
the income of the other members of your group. On the other hand, you earn
from each point that other members of your group contribute to the project.
For each point that another group member contributes, you earn 0:4£1 = 0:4
points.
You take your decision via the computer. After all participants have made
their contributions a new period starts, in which you decide again how many
of your 20 points you want to contribute to the project. In total there will be
20 periods.
28B Within-subject comparison
Individual correlation between own and others' contributions (learning and standard con-
dition): Spearman rank-correlation coe±cient; positive and signi¯cant (+); negative and sig-
ni¯cant ({); insigni¯cant (0); ® = 0:05.
Subject Learning Standard Subject Learning Standard
1 0 0 31 0 +
2 0 { 32 0 +
3 0 0 33 0 +
4 0 0 34 0 +
5 + + 35 0 0
6 + + 36 0 +
7 + + 37 0 +
8 0 0 38 0 +
9 0 0 39 0 0
10 0 0 40 0 +
11 0 0 41 0 +
12 0 0 42 0 0
13 0 0 43 0 0
14 0 + 44 0 +
15 0 + 45 0 +
16 0 + 46 0 0
17 0 + 47 0 0
18 0 + 48 0 0
19 0 + 49 0 +
20 0 + 50 0 0
21 0 + 51 0 0
22 + + 52 0 0
23 0 + 53 0 +
24 0 0 54 0 +
25 0 0 55 0 0
26 0 0 56 0 +
27 0 0 57 0 0
28 0 + 58 0 0
29 0 + 59 0 +
30 0 + 60 0 0
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Figure 7: Contributions in groups over time in the Learning Condition
31